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Soslovie and the “Foreign” Clergies
of Imperial Russia
Estate rights or service rights?
Soslovie et les clergés « étrangers » de la Russie impériale : droits inhérents à un
ordre ou droits inhérents à une fonction ?
Paul W. Werth
1 In a petition to the emperor in 1896, a mullah in the South Caucasus by the name of Abdul
Akhmed-ogly  requested  enhanced  privileges  for  his  unfortunate  children.  “Having
devoted my entire life to the service of Your Imperial Majesty’s throne and our dear
fatherland,” wrote Akhmed-ogly, “for more than twenty-three years in the named post I
have experienced many, many material deprivations, mainly because, as a member of the
parish clergy, which receives no defined salary, I have been compelled to support myself
and my family through the voluntary contributions of my parishioners.” The poverty of
his flock meant that Akhmed-ogly was scarcely able to provide for his own old age and
could not support his children, who “do not acquire any rights or privileges” as a result of
his clerical service. Placing his hopes in the sovereign’s “limitless mercy,” the petitioner
implored the emperor to grant his children, “with the goal of freeing them from labor
and money obligations,”  the  status  of  “personal  honorary  citizen”  that  imperial  law
otherwise granted only to members of the Islamic “higher clergy” in the South Caucasus
after twenty years of impeccable service. As there were no “legal foundations” for the
satisfaction  of  this  request,  however,  Akhmed-ogly’s  petition  was  rejected:  only  the
children of the “higher clergy” were entitled to claim the status of “honorary citizen.”1
2 Akhmed-ogly’s petition and its resolution point to a peculiarity of the Muslim “clergy” in
Imperial Russia when compared to its Orthodox counterpart – namely, its legal division
into “higher” and “lower.” To be sure, the Orthodox clergy in Russia was beset by internal
distinctions, most notably between “black” (monastic) and “white” (parish). Yet for all
the  associated  divergences  in  wealth,  education,  and  esteem,  a  central  motif  in  the
history of that clergy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the consolidation of a
“clerical estate” (dukhovnoe soslovie),  which featured equal status rights and privileges
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within its ranks.2 Indeed, the experience of the Orthodox clergy was in certain respects
paradigmatic for the emergence of the estate order in Russia, a proposition confirmed by
the fact that it is precisely the premier social historian of the Orthodox clergy who has
written probably the single most important work on the soslovie problem, at  least  in
English.3 The “imperial turn” of recent years has done much to draw attention to the
imperial dimension of historical problems that were previously analyzed primarily or
exclusively as “Russian” issues.4 The question of soslovie in Russia represents a promising
terrain for extending this approach and for linking analytically processes characteristic
of the Russian center and its “borderlands” into a single, all-imperial notion of social,
institutional,  and legal  change.  After  all,  certain collectivities  that  are  now regarded
primarily in ethnic terms – for example, Bashkirs – were arguably a soslovie group more
than anything else.5 Modes of classifying Russia’s far-flung population depended on the
deployment of categories and a general system that encompassed central provinces as
well as the periphery.6 For one historian, the very institution of soslovie itself, as well as
the  consciousness  of  the  group-based  rights  that  accompanied  it,  was  a  product  of
imperial governance, which embraced, institutionalized, and legitimized difference.7 The
issue of  estate status in borderlands or ethnically and religiously mixed areas of  the
empire was especially complicated and has the potential to offer new insights on the
nature of the soslovie order.8
3 This essay rests on the premise that the question of the estate status of religious servitors
of  Russia’s  non-Orthodox  faiths – the  so-called  “foreign  confessions” – represents  a
profitable way of uniting analytically the problems of empire and social status, for the
greater  illumination of  both.  This  problem has  only begun to attract  the interest  of
scholars,  who  were  previously  inclined  to  see  “the  clergy”  in  Russia  as  exclusively
Orthodox servitors.9 Robert Crews has described the ways in which tsarist authorities
“grappled with the juridical definition of a Muslim clergy as a social estate,” though his
account pertains exclusively to Muslim servitors in the Volga-Ural region and thus leaves
figures  in  Crimea,  the  South  Caucasus,  and  Central  Asia  beyond  consideration.10
M.N. Farkhshatov provides an illuminating discussion of the “Muslim clergy” across the
Russian Empire, while noting the absence of a Muslim clerical estate, with the partial
exception of servitors in Crimea. But on the whole the soslovie question is not central to
his account.11 In his analysis of social estates (Stände) in the context of the 1897 census,
Christoph Schmidt notes a general tendency of imperial legislation to equalize the legal
standing of the clerics of Russia’s several Christian confessions, but his brief analysis is
designed more as a commentary to statistical data on the census than as a systematic
study of the problem of the clerical estate as such.12 Finally, in a massive tome devoted to
Imperial Russia’s “soslovie society,” N.A. Ivanova and V.P. Zheltova include non-Orthodox
servitors in their discussion of the clergy, but their account is largely descriptive and
lacks a diachronic dimension.13 To my knowledge, in no other cases have the status rights
of  non-Orthodox  religious  servitors  been  investigated  systematically  or  related
analytically to the larger problem of the estate order. Nor has there been any attempt to
situate  all  the  servitors  of  Russia  –  Orthodox  and  non-Orthodox  alike  –  in  a  single
framework for analysis of estate rights and privileges.
4 The present essay undertakes these tasks as part of a larger project of investigating the
terms on which the foreign confessions and their adherents were integrated into the
tsarist civil order, and the ways in which that integration was mediated by confessional
institutions and the deep penetration of major areas of civil law by religious principles.
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My goal is to ascertain the extent to which one may discern a clerical estate for the
foreign confessions, the standards by which individuals were recognized as belonging to a
non-Orthodox clergy, and more generally the rights and privileges to which servitors of
the foreign confessions were entitled. In a broader sense, I seek to determine the extent
to which a distinct “spiritual domain” (dukhovnoe vedomstvo) in Imperial Russia actually
encompassed non-Orthodox religions,14 and thus to identify with greater precision the
role of religion, in a supra-confessional sense, in the organization and functioning of the
Russian Empire.
5 In order to clarify the rights and status of various religious servitors – Christian and non-
Christian alike – I  draw on a useful  distinction made by Vasilii  Kliuchevskii  between
“estate rights” (soslovnye prava) and “service rights” or “rights of office” (dolzhnostnye
prava).  The first,  Kliuchevskii  remarks,  were granted “to an entire class of  society in
permanent  possession”  and  were  therefore  distinct  both  from  privileges  given  to  a
particular person or family and from rights acquired through service or, more accurately,
through the occupation of a particular post. Thus while service rights varied substantially
depending on the degree of  authority associated with each office,  estate rights were
identical for all persons of the given estate. Moreover, whereas the member of a given
estate was free to use or not use the rights of his status, this was not true of the rights and
obligations of a given office, precisely because they were fundamental to the associated
duties. Finally, the powers granted by office were not transferable to the next generation,
whereas estate rights, by their very essence, were hereditary.15 My central conclusion in
this  article is  that  Christian servitors,  beginning with the Orthodox clergy,  gradually
acquired estate rights, while non-Christian servitors – on the whole – were able to acquire
only service rights. Yet I also propose that this straightforward conclusion, accurate in its
broad outline, masks a more complicated and interesting history.
* * *
6 Although Imperial  Russia  was  by  no means  unique for having a  society  made up of
distinct  social  legal  estates,  the precise character of  this  order and the timing of  its
emergence  set  Russia  apart  from  most  of  its  European  neighbors.  Historians  have
sometimes exaggerated the degree of state initiative in the creation of estates in Russia,
but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the autocracy played a greater role in this
process than did other European governments. This meant not only that estates in Russia
were weak with respect to the monarchy and thus incapable of playing the role that they
had in old-regime Europe, but also that the Russian system of estates was only in the
process  of  construction  as  its  European  counterparts  were  being  dismantled.16 Only
toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  did  the  nobility,  urban  population,  and
Orthodox clergy begin to emerge in Russia as  distinct  corporate bodies with specific
rights and privileges. With a bit of a lag, Russian terminology reflected this consolidation.
Around the start of the nineteenth century, the term “status” (sostoianie) came to denote
“legal status group,” whether privileged or not, and was used in this sense until the fall of
the tsarist order.17 At approximately the same time, the term soslovie emerged as a rough
synonym, signifying a legal, formally constituted estate. Combining the ideas of “state
institution” and “social group,” by the 1820s this term was being applied beyond the four
principal estates – nobility, townspeople, clergy, and peasants – to other social groups,
always with the implication of cultural and legal distinctiveness. Whereas sostoianie was
Soslovie and the “Foreign” Clergies of Imperial Russia
Cahiers du monde russe, 51/2-3 | 2010
3
the term used more often in formal law, soslovie gained wider currency among educated
Russians in describing their  society.  The consolidation of  this  soslovie order occurred
primarily in the first half of the nineteenth century – the order was substantially codified
in the Law Digest (Svod zakonov) beginning in the 1830s. To be sure, the aggregation of
various  social  groups  into  estates  was  never  completed,  and the  tsarist  social  order
therefore always contained important elements of flexibility and adaptability. Moreover,
new identities rooted in class and occupation became increasingly important markers of
social difference as the nineteenth century progressed. But for all this, identities rooted
in estates and the rights defined by ascription to one or another status in the tsarist order
remained crucial until 1917. Moreover, the state’s practical and ideological commitment
to the estate order actually intensified after the Great Reforms of the 1860s.18
7 The most cohesive of these estates was the Orthodox clergy.19 As Gregory Freeze has
documented, Orthodox parish clergy underwent a fundamental transformation over the
course of  the eighteenth century.  Among the attributes of  the clergy that eventually
distinguished it most sharply from its Muscovite predecessors was precisely its definition
as a “clerical estate” (dukhovnoe soslovie), characterized by particularistic status rights, a
distinct  culture,  and a  rigidly  hereditary  character.  This  estate  encompassed diverse
elements within the clergy – both celibate monastic (black) and married parish (white)
clergy; the two strata of ordained clerics and unordained sacristans – and also included
priests’ families – wives, sons, and daughters. Indeed, members of the Holy Synod under
Catherine II insisted that all decisions on clerical rights concern “the clergy altogether
rather than part of it,” based on the proposition that “the clergy is essentially one and
indivisible, since the duty of all men of the cloth is to administer the sacraments, [to]
perform the Divine Service and to teach.”20 This outcome reflected the aspiration of both
church and state  to  separate  the  sacred and the  profane  –  that  is,  to  consolidate  a
“spiritual domain.” But perhaps more immediately it was a function of elites’ efforts to
impose  a  more  standardized  Orthodoxy  on  diverse  local  religious  practices,  and
furthermore to elevate and dignify the clergy through education, privilege, and a more
economically rational distribution of clerical posts. It was admittedly a gradual process:
rights,  status,  and corporate character  remained only provisionally  and incompletely
defined over the course of the eighteenth century. And although the status of the clergy
had become firmly grounded in heredity through reforms of the 1760s-70s, its standing as
a legal estate is probably best dated to the early nineteenth century. There also continued
to be certain anomalies. In the Caucasus, some Georgian clerics even remained enserfed
until  1808  (in  Imeretiia  until  1821),  and their  children  born  before  that  date  often
encountered difficulty in proving their free status until their entitlement to liberation
was  clearly  specified  in  1861.21 Still,  viewed  against  broader  processes  of  social
amalgamation pertaining to virtually all social groups in Imperial Russia, the Orthodox
clergy undoubtedly became the most cohesive of the country’s various estates.22
8 It  would  be  difficult  to  conclude,  however,  that  this  development  was  necessarily
beneficial  to  the  Orthodox Church.  In  the nineteenth century,  considerable  criticism
emerged from various quarters about the clergy’s caste-like character, and among the
reforms of the 1860s was an attempt to abolish the hereditary character of the clerical
estate. Publicists and bureaucrats agreed that the estate not only produced far too many
candidates  for  clerical  vacancies,  but  also  favored  family  claims  over  merit  in
appointment, channeled sons into the priesthood without regard for commitment and
zeal, and produced a peculiar culture that segregated the clergy excessively from other
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groups. Determined to convert the priesthood into an open social body, state officials
embarked on a  significant  reform –  even as  clerics  themselves  exhibited rather  less
enthusiasm for  such transformations.  In  1867,  the  Synod abrogated family  claims to
clerical positions, and two years later – in immediate response to a desperate need for
educated (secular)  manpower in Russia’s  Catholic-dominated western provinces – the
state conferred secular legal status on priests’ children, thereby eliminating the central
legal impediment to their exit from the clerical estate in favor of other careers. Now
enjoying  the  rank  of  personal  nobility  and  thus  being  capable  of  leaving  the  estate
without falling into the ranks of the lowly poll-tax population, many clerical sons left the
estate  for  other  endeavors,  especially  as  the  reform  also  offered  special  tuition
exemptions for state schools, above all in the western provinces. The reform also allowed
clerical children – daughters and sons alike – to marry outside of the estate.23
9 It was the issue of clerical wives that revealed the limits of this dismantling of the estate
and that produced a reassertion of the estate principle (soslovnost´)  in the 1870s.  The
reforms of the 1860s had logically raised the question of the status of priests’  wives,
especially in widowhood. Priests were determined to ensure that their own deaths not
result  in a social  demotion for their  wives,  and reformers accordingly proposed that
spouses, like children, obtain secular status (that of either personal noble or personal
honored citizen) that would ensure privileged status independently of their husbands.24
By recommending that only the clergy itself, and not their dependents, should belong to
the estate, this proposal represented a departure from the estate system too great for
senior officials to countenance. The State Council, while acknowledging that the Great
Reforms  had  altered  the  relationship  among the  various  estates  of  imperial  society,
insisted that those estates – including the clerical one – nonetheless would continue to
exist. Indeed the Council maintained that it was neither occupation (zvanie), holy orders (
san), nor degree (stepen´) that conferred specific civil rights on the clergy (or any other
group), but precisely membership in the clerical estate.25 In Freeze’s view, the Council’s
conclusion was of “extraordinary significance,” since it signaled a fundamental shift from
an  anti-estate  orientation  within  the  government  in  the  1860s  back  towards  one
determined to fortify the soslovie principle as a central attribute of the tsarist social order.
26 In short, whatever the deficiencies of the clerical estate, the autocracy was willing to go
no further than allowing priests’ children to leave it. Otherwise, the idea of the clergy
(and their wives) as a distinct soslovie remained essentially in place.27
10 If  the  Orthodox clerical  estate  had  consolidated  by  the  late  eighteenth  century,  the
development of non-Orthodox clerical estates lagged behind considerably and ultimately
proved much less complete. Thus while the first edition of the Law Digest in 1832 codified
provisions on the Orthodox clergy, with regard to the foreign confessions it merely noted
that laws on non-Orthodox servitors properly belonged to distinct spheres of legislation –
codes pertaining to specific regions or particular religious groups – that were only then
being  compiled.28 A  combination  of  the  abolition  of  the  Lithuanian  Statute  in  1840
(obviating  the  need for  a  special  code  in  one important  borderland region)  and the
recognition that the rights of religious servitors were not in fact a matter of regional
specificity led statesmen in 1842 to the conclusion that the general Law Digest should
include provisions “on the clergy of the other Christian faiths that are freely confessed in
Russia under the protection of the government.”29 The 1842 edition partially filled this
lacuna by codifying laws that regulated the status of clerics for the foreign Christian
confessions,  but explicitly denied non-Christian servitors the status of clerical estates
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with collective status rights (see below).30 Not until 1899 did the Law Digest codify a series
of “general enactments” on clergies in Russia, and even then these specifically excluded
non-Christian servitors.31
11 In fact, there was considerable confusion over whether non-Christian religious servitors
actually  constituted  a  clergy  at  all.  Certainly  in  an  informal  sense  Russian  officials
referred to such servitors using that term (dukhovenstvo). Yet on numerous occasions they
acknowledged that this designation was not entirely accurate, as it implied elements of
hierarchy and organization that often did not actually exist. Writing of the situation in
the South Caucasus in 1849, the official N.V. Khanykov stressed that before the Russian
annexation of the region several decades earlier, “the [Muslim] ecclesiastical hierarchy
was never firmly demarcated, and the clerical class […] did not constitute a particular
caste, and only learning served as the basis for distinction between various levels of that
estate.”32 The governor-general of Turkestan wrote of his region at one point, “Mosque
servitors (sostoiashchie pri mecheti) do not carry the title of clergy, as that term is
understood by our laws; the local population does not know such a title.”33 In 1856, in an
apparent attempt to avoid the term “clergy,” the head of the Emperor’s Second Division,
Dmitrii Nikolaevich Bludov, proposed the expression “spiritual parish leaders” (dukhovnye
prikhodskie nachal´niki) to designate the various figures who performed religious functions
in Islam.34 In a similar fashion, a state official sent to survey Buddhism in Siberia in 1860
concluded that it was a mistake to have treated lamas as a spiritual “corporation” with a
distinct  hierarchy  and  a  clear  set  of  duties  with  respect  to  the  laity.35 A  special
government commission in St. Petersburg in 1906 likewise concluded that lamas “can
under  no  circumstances  be  likened  to  Christian  parish  clergy,”  and  used  the  term
“servitors of the faith” (verosluzhiteli) to designate that group (as well as Islamic ones).36 In
general, the more the state learned about what non-Christian servitors actually did, the
less inclined it was to see the term “clergy” as an accurate descriptor. But this knowledge,
such as it was, appeared only gradually.
12 Nor  was  it  clear  which  particular  servitors,  from the  range  of  figures  who  fulfilled
functions that could conceivably be regarded as “spiritual,” actually merited inclusion in
this category. For Judaism, the state’s recognition of rabbis alone as religious figures
meriting special privileges eliminated any need for the Law Digest even to invoke a Jewish
“clergy,” since it was enough simply to refer to “rabbis.”37 Among Buddhists in Astrakhan
province, at least after 1847, the law recognized only one “lama,” as well as a “bakshi” for
Kalmyks in the Don region, referring otherwise to “religious figures” (dukhovnyia litsa), as
if their identity was self-evident.38 In the case of Karaites and Siberian Buddhists, the
state was faced with a series  of  ranks and titles,  but used the legal  statute for each
confession as an occasion to specify which of these actually constituted the “clergy” for
legal purposes.39 The situation was undoubtedly most complicated in the case of Islam, for
which a plethora of designations – mullah, akhun, imam, khatyb, kadi, muezzin, etc. – was
used to signify servitors, scholars, judges, and respected figures among Muslims. These
terms were in many cases overlapping, changing, or inflected with particular regional or
local meanings, and it was not always clear whether the duties involved were primarily
“spiritual” – and thus the proper provenance of a “clergy” – or something else instead.40
Archival documents suggest that imperial statesmen were in many cases uncertain about
the specific functions of these figures and the relationships among them. Nor did they
receive unambiguous information from the sources through which they sought to clarify
the issue.41 Thus in the early 1860s, the Orenburg Muslim Assembly and the unofficial
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expert on Islam in the Department of Foreign Confessions, Alexander Kazembek, reached
quite  different  conclusions  about  whether  the  designation  akhun represented  an
honorary title or a clerical rank, and therefore about the process by which the Assembly
should confirm candidates in that position.42 Kazembek proposed, based on his reading of
sharia, that a “Muslim clerical estate […] really does exist” (v nature sushchestvuet), and he
therefore  attributed  existing  confusion  to  “the  mistakes  that  have  crept  into  our
legislation concerning the allocation of Mohammedan clerical posts in the Tauride and
Orenburg jurisdictions and the incongruous assignment of rights and privileges to those
posts.”43 But it seems more plausible that these complications derived from the difficulty
of distinguishing a Muslim “spiritual domain” and its servitors clearly from other areas of
life in which Islam continued to play an important role – particularly given regional
differences and the absence of a clearly defined hierarchy. More fundamentally, it seems
that in contrast to a “clergy,” which could be said to exist regardless of whether or not it
was recognized by law, a clerical estate, entailing the official recognition of specific rights
and privileges, was a function of state power and therefore could not exist “in nature;” it
could only be brought into existence by law or decree.
13 Indeed, even the state’s characterization of a group of servitors as a “clergy” did not
mean that they necessarily constituted a legal estate. If we examine Russia’s numerous
religious servitors in terms of their rights,  privileges, and corporative status, we find
three distinct  tiers.  The first  were the servitors of  the eastern Christian confessions,
Orthodoxy and Gregorianism (the Armenian Church).44 The circle of persons enjoying
clerical  status  rights  for  these  two confessions  included both  ordained  clerics  (from
metropolitans  and  bishops  down  to  parish  priests  and  deacons)  and  unordained
sacristans – although the latter were on a distinctly lower economic and cultural level by
the 1820s and often received new privileges later than their ordained counterparts.45 It
also included the clergy’s wives and – at least until 1869-1870 – their children.46 Indeed, as
the  legal  scholar  Konstantin Kavelin  noted  in  1862,  only  in  the  case  of  these  two
confessions did one see “persons who lack holy orders but belong to the clerical estate” (
ne nosiashchie dukhovnago sana, no prinadlezhashchie k dukhovnomu sostoianiiu).47 Moreover,
these status rights were identical across the entire hierarchy and were defined in terms
of a distinct “clerical estate” (dukhovnoe sostoianie). While legally open to people of other
social status, the Orthodox clerical estate tended to be closed and caste-like, drawing new
servitors primarily from among the sons of the old.48 The extent to which this was true
for the Armenian clergy remains unclear. There was, however, a general tendency on the
part  of  the  state  to  extend  the  rights  of  the  Orthodox  clergy  to  their  Armenian
counterparts, and thus to treat the two groups as identical social and legal formations.49
These two confessions were also distinct in that the highest echelons of the hierarchy,
most notably bishops,  had to belong to the “black,” or monastic clergy,  whereas the
parish clergy (the “white” clergy) was not celibate. In the case of the eastern confessions,
then, the two clergies constituted a distinct estate which, at least until its opening in
1869-1870, encompassed both clergymen and their families.50
14 In  the  second tier  –  the  other  Christian  confessions  –  the  clergy  was  defined  more
narrowly  as  the  priesthood  alone.  Thus  in  1851,  Bludov  characterized  unordained
servitors  for  this  group  as  “hired  servitors”  (sluzhashchie  po  naimu)  rather  than  “a
particular status group or a class of people in the country.”51 The law accordingly stated
that  only  ordained  members  of  the  Catholic  clergy  were  exempt  from  corporal
punishment, and that figures such as cantors, organists, and bell-ringers in the Protestant
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confessions  “do not  belong to  the clergy.”52 The Catholic  clergy could of  course  not
constitute a closed estate like its Orthodox counterpart,  because all  of its members –
“white” clergy and monastic clergy alike – were celibate. Their ranks therefore had to be
replenished in each generation from other social groups. Any Catholic (male) of a “free
social status” could enter the clergy, and in 1839 this possibility was extended even to the
tax-paying population, as long as the local community and/or landlord gave assent.53
Although pastors were not celibate and therefore might have become a relatively closed
clergy like that in Orthodoxy, Lutherans seem to have had at least some aversion to the
idea of pastors constituting a religious caste.54 Thus the two clergies were similar in their
openness, despite their contrasting views on celibacy. The nature of clerical status in the
two  confessions  differed,  nonetheless.  Ordination  in  the  Catholic  clergy  constituted
ascription to a distinct social status (sostoianie), whereas Protestant pastors were simply
granted the rights of personal (non-hereditary) nobility for as long as they served in that
capacity.55 In essence, then, there was no Protestant clerical status as such, and in some
regards this group might better be placed with the third tier, the non-Christian groups.
15 That  third  tier  was  the  most  complicated.  On the  one hand,  as  a  matter  of  general
principle,  the  law  stubbornly  refused  to  acknowledge  the  general  existence  of  non-
Christian  clerical  estates.  In  1829,  the  head of  the  Main  Directorate  for  the  Foreign
Confessions, Filipp Vigel´, remarked that neither Muslim servitors nor rabbis constituted
“a particularly privileged class.”56 More categorical was the statement in the 1842 edition
of the Law Digest: “Persons conducting religious services by the rituals of non-Christian
faiths  do  not  constitute  particular  estates  in  this  country”  (ne  sostavliaiut  osobykh  v
Gosudarstve soslovii).57 In addressing the non-Christian confessions, the assembled statutes
on the  foreign  confessions  in  the  1857  edition  of  the  Digest  avoided the  expression
“clerical  estate,”  with  its  implication  of  collective  status  rights,  in  favor  of  simply
“clergy” (dukhovenstvo), which in this case signified merely an occupational group.58 This
principle – rights conferred by service rather than collective status rights – had by this
time become the standard for non-Christian religious servitors. Thus if a Muslim cleric
was relieved of his post, he lost his clerical privileges until he could find a new one.59 In
the case of Judaism, rabbis began to enjoy certain rights – for example, exemption from
corporal punishment – only after they had served for a term of three years and had been
re-elected to their positions by their local communities.60 The proposition that these non-
Christian servitors had not really acquired a new status by their election or appointment
is underscored by the fact that their local communities were still responsible for the taxes
and labor duties from which servitors themselves had been exempted: the state was still
determined to  collect  taxes  from them,  if  not  directly.61 In  1899,  the  Department  of
Foreign Confessions stated explicitly that even after official confirmation in their posts,
Muslim servitors remained in the same estate from which they had been elected.62
16 On the other hand, there is evidence that at certain points the government contemplated
the creation of a distinct Muslim clerical estate. This is evident in the statute of 1831 on
Muslims  in  Crimea,  which  recognized  a  closed,  hereditary  Islamic  “clerical  estate”  (
dukhovnoe sostoianie),  from which all  Muslim servitors above a certain level had to be
drawn.63 Moreover,  the first edition of the Law Digest (1832) drew a clear distinction
between the “Mohammedan clergy,” whose status was yet to be described elsewhere or in
later  editions,  and “the  clergy  of  other  non-Christian  confessions,”  which  “does  not
constitute a distinct status in this country.”64 Likewise, in arguing for the granting of
certain privileges to Muslim servitors in the late 1840s,  the “enlightened bureaucrat”
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Pavel Kiselev  clearly  distinguished  such  servitors  from  their  Jewish  and  Buddhist
counterparts, if only because of Russia’s large Muslim population and the even larger
numbers of Muslims beyond Russia’s borders, precisely where the empire seemed most
likely to expand in the future.65
17 In fact, however, this notion of a distinct Muslim clerical estate seems never to have had
any real application beyond Crimea, and even there the idea was called into question
almost as soon as it had been codified in the statute of 1831. A year later, in 1832, the
mufti of Crimea complained to the government that many Islamic servitors – the number
turned out to be 864 – in fact had come not from the clerical estate, but from the taxable
population. The Muslim spiritual board in Crimea requested the expulsion of all of these
servitors from their positions and the election by local  communities of  replacements
exclusively  of  clerical  origin.  The  interior  ministry  countered  that  a  purge  of  such
magnitude would disrupt religious life in Muslim communities and cause unrest among
Crimean Tatars. Those servitors should therefore be allowed to remain in their positions
as long as local communities had properly accepted them and were satisfied with their
service. They themselves – but not their children – were to be ascribed to the clerical
estate.66 However, the state’s refusal to enforce strictly the monopoly of the clerical estate
over  clerical  positions  in  this  case  did  not  signal  an  abandonment  of  the  idea  of  a
hereditary Muslim clergy in Crimea. While the state subsequently sought to ensure that
membership in the clergy depend on the formal occupation of a clerical post (as opposed
to claims based solely on heredity),67 the Law Digest of 1857 nonetheless confirmed the
principle that only those in Crimea belonging to the clergy by descent – that is, the sons
of clerical servitors – could occupy clerical positions.68
18 Yet even as the law upheld the idea of a hereditary Muslim clergy in Crimea, it refused to
extend  this  principle  to  Muslim  servitors  elsewhere.  The  state’s  opposition  to  the
consolidation of a unified Muslim clerical estate was most clearly evident in the case of
the South Caucasus, where those preparing the statutes of 1872 not only characterized
the inheritance of religious ranks to be intrinsically “harmful” – in notable contrast to
Crimea,  but  consistent  with thinking at  the  time on the  Orthodox clergy –  but  also
explicitly stated their intention “not to allow the clergy of the whole region a single,
general corporate character.”69 The division of Muslim servitors into “higher clergy” and
“parish” or “mosque clergy” at the lower levels – even in Crimea – was yet another
manifestation of this outlook directed against consolidation.70
19 Indeed,  it  was  generally  the  case  that  the  rights  of  non-Christian  servitors  varied
depending on their place in their respective hierarchies. Thus for Karaites and Buddhists,
all members of the clergy were exempt from taxes and conscription, but only more senior
members  were  exempt  from  corporal  punishment.71 For  Islam  there  was  an  added
geographical  dimension,  as  privileges  differed  for  the  jurisdictions  of  Orenburg  and
Tauride.  Thus  while  in  Orenburg’s  district  exemption  from  military  service  was  a
privilege enjoyed by only the “higher” Muslim servitors (muftii and akhun), in Crimea
and the South Caucasus it was a privilege of the entire Tatar population, clerics and non-
clerics alike.72 Like their Christian counterparts, rabbis and some Muslim servitors were
personally exempt from conscription and corporal punishment,73 but only some upper-
level Muslim servitors in the Tauride district were unconditionally free from taxes and
duties.74 Summarizing this situation for Islam in 1865, a state commission for review of
the recruitment statute concluded that the Muslim clergy did not possess “estate rights” (
soslovnyia prava), “for they do not enjoy identical privileges throughout the empire.”75
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20 There was, admittedly, some movement towards the consolidation of a coherent class of
non-Christian servitors in the tsarist social order. The state proved partially receptive to
a  series  of  petitions,  beginning  in  1841,  from  Muslim  servitors  of  the  Orenburg
jurisdiction to grant legal recognition of corporative privileges for them. In 1850, the
State Council accordingly granted them exemptions from military conscription and from
corporal punishment – privileges that had already been conferred on the upper echelons
of the Islamic hierarchy.76 But in most cases such developments stopped short of any
meaningful change. A project for the reform of the state rabbinate in the early 1860s
could be construed – and indeed was construed by some contemporaries – as an attempt
to create a spiritual soslovie for Jews, at least in the sense of a hierarchy. Yet this proposal
encountered both the typical bureaucratic inertia and also principled opposition to the
idea that a “Christian state” should do any more than it already had to organize non-
Christian religions.77 In the mid-1860s, Kazembek agitated for a standardization of rights
and privileges of Muslim servitors in the jurisdictions of Orenburg and Tauride, which
would allow the government both to express “its concern for its Muslim subjects” and “to
relieve itself of  many extraneous  titles that  have wrongfully been given particularistic
rights and privileges.”78 For reasons that are not clear, however, no such simplification
actually occurred. The extension of the exemption from corporal punishment to all non-
Christian servitors and even to their children in 1863 perhaps reflected the state’s desire
to  constitute  a  full-fledged  non-Christian  clerical  estate.79 But  this  aspiration  was
essentially at odds with the anti-soslovie orientation of policy on the Orthodox clergy at
the same time.
21 In any event,  the law’s 1842 declaration that the executors of non-Christian religious
services “do not constitute particular estates in this country” was repeated in almost all
subsequent editions of the Digest – and in contrast to the 1832 edition, Muslim servitors
were no longer considered an exception to this rule.80 Throughout the imperial period,
codes on the social  status of  the empire’s  population accordingly addressed only the
rights and privileges of the Christian clergies.81 In short, non-Christian servitors slowly
acquired  attributes  of  a  clerical  estate,  but  this  process  remained  incomplete  and
conditioned by the state’s stubborn refusal to recognize such a thing explicitly.
22 Although specific privileges varied somewhat from religion to religion (and within Islam
on the basis of geography and cleric “rank”), we may say that clerical servitors generally
enjoyed an enhanced status when compared to the vast majority of the population. Most,
eventually,  acquired exemptions from taxation and duties,  military conscription,  and
corporal punishment – regardless of whether they were recognized as a clerical estate
akin to the Orthodox one. It should be noted, however, that for most religions the law
allowed clerical servitors of noble origin to retain their noble rights, including the right
to acquire land occupied by serfs.82 Such cases seem to have been rare in the case of
Orthodox and Protestant clerics,83 while it was apparently more common in the case of
Catholicism.84 In  short,  noble  status  trumped  all  others,  and  clerical  service  could
therefore enhance one’s rights and privileges, but not reduce them.
23 To  the  extent  that  even  non-Christian  servitors  represented  privileged  groups,  the
imperial  government had good reason to regulate the process of  entrance into their
ranks. The state’s general aspiration – and this pertained to almost all of the confessions –
was to inhibit the proliferation of “excess clergy.” In this regard three motivations – aside
from limiting access to privilege – were central. The first of these was financial, since it
was  clear  that  in  many  locales  parishioners  could  only  support  so  many  religious
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servitors. In this regard Orthodoxy, the empire’s “ruling” faith, was no different than the
other confessions and was indeed the first to incur these limitations. Secondly, the state
was generally reluctant to sanction numbers of clerics that would place non-Orthodox
faiths at an advantage with respect to Orthodoxy. Thus, in 1849 the emperor authorized
the extension of privileges only to those Muslim servitors who belonged to an official,
registered clergy (shtatnoe dukhovenstvo) that would be defined “with reference to [the
number of] Orthodox [clergy] in relation to the population.”85 Yet officials proved willing
not to insist on this condition too categorically, noting, for example, that the dispersed
character  of  Tatar  settlement  among  Russians  might  justify  a  higher  clergy-to-
parishioner ratio.86 Finally, the government also harbored particular prejudices against
the servitors of the foreign confessions and was therefore determined not to permit their
unwarranted “multiplication.” Thus after the opening of the Catholic priesthood to the
taxable population in 1839 produced a flood of new aspirants to the clergy, the governor-
general in Vil´na invoked the “fanaticism” and “tendency to proselytism” supposedly
characteristic of Catholic priests to conclude, especially in light of the recent absorption
of  Uniates  into  Orthodoxy,  that  “the  multiplication of  this  class  can  in  my  opinion
scarcely be unharmful.”87 Comparable statements could be produced for other servitors,
especially by the 1860s or so.
24 Provisions  preventing  the  appearance  of  “excessive”  clergy  took  several  forms.  For
Orthodoxy, Peter the Great established a new clerical registry (dukhovnyi shtat) to address
this  problem  in  1722.  The  registry  specified  a  three-man  clerical  staff  for  every
100 households, though admittedly this new standard was not rigorously enforced for the
next  half-century  or  so.  A  new  registry  in  1778  established  150 households  as  the
minimum for such staff, and now enforcement became more serious.88 Broadly similar
requirements were established for other confessions in time. A Senate decree of 1819
specified one Catholic priest for every 400 souls.89 In Siberia, entrance into the Buddhist
clerisy was limited by a registry created in 1853 and by the requirement that rendered
eligible only the third son of each set of parents, while each Buddhist temple among
Kalmyks could have only twelve lamas.90 Less  concrete provisions existed for Islamic
servitors. A decree of 1850 implied that a registry [shtat] would eventually be produced
for servitors in the Orenburg district. As this never occurred, however, numbers were
indirectly  limited  by  the  provision  that  each  Muslim  “parish”  have  no  fewer  than
200 male souls.91 This provision of course did not directly limit the number of Islamic
clerical servitors, and some mosques in fact served far fewer than 200 souls.92 There is
reason to believe that other limitations could also not always be upheld.
25 It would be wrong, however, to suppose that the state sought always to impose excessive
limitations on the clerical ranks of the foreign confessions.  In response to the Vil´na
governor-general’s trepidations about large numbers of Catholic priests (noted above),
the  Department  of  Foreign  Confessions  in  St. Petersburg  noted,  following  the  local
Catholic bishop’s assertions, that by existing standards the diocese was entitled to have
more  priests,  and  the  government  should  not  inhibit  attainment  of  the  1:400  ratio
(though the papacy complained that strict enforcement of this principle was resulting in
the closing of Catholic parishes).93 In 1849, Khanykov argued that the government had
done too much to block entrance into the Muslim clergy in the South Caucasus and
instead advocated a balance between promoting “the unlimited spread of that class” and
the adoption of “stern measures that serve to limit its expansion but do not accord with
local custom.”94 In the case of the Armenian confession – perhaps by oversight – there
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was in fact no legal regulation of the size of the clergy at all, although officialdom was
convinced by the late nineteenth century that their numbers were “excessive.”95 Nor am I
aware of such limitations in the case of Protestant pastors.
26 As noted above, the 1899 edition of the Law Digest (vol. IX) included several “general
enactments” on clergies in Russia, yet the relationship between religious servitors and
estate status remained inconsistent as the country entered the twentieth century. The
promise of religious reform after the Revolution of 1905 might perhaps have provided a
logical occasion for the imperial government to address this issue definitively. Yet the
question of  estate  status  did not  occupy a  prominent  place in reform efforts,  which
focused primarily on the issues of conversion, family law, the juridical status of religious
communities on the local  level,  and the reorganization of institutions of confessional
administration.96 In the post-1905 period, perhaps the most contested issue involving a
non-Orthodox clergy concerned the Old Believers, to whose servitors the regime had long
denied recognition as a clergy in order to uphold the official church’s exclusive claim to
embody Orthodoxy. In the famous decree of 17 April 1905, Old Belief essentially gained
the status of a recognized “foreign confession,” and its servitors accordingly acquired
many of  the  basic  rights  enjoyed  by  other  (Christian)  clerics,  perhaps  most  notably
exclusion from the ranks of the urban lower middle class (meshchanstvo) or the peasantry
(sel´skie obyvateli).97 Yet even here the clerical issue concerned above all nomenclature and
its canonical significance – i.e., whether these servitors were entitled to the designation
“clergymen”  (sviashchenno-sluzhiteli),  with  its  implication  of  apostolic  succession  and
parity  with their  official  Orthodox counterparts,  or  merely  the titles  of  “deans” and
“mentors” (nastoiateli and nastavniki), which would reinforce their inferior standing. As
with so many other issues of religious reform, these remained unresolved on the eve of
the Great War.98
* * *
27 If  the  Orthodox  clergy  constituted  a  coherent  social  estate  by  the  early  nineteenth
century,  the  same  cannot  be  said  for  the  servitors  of  most  of  the  other  foreign
confessions. True, the Armenian clergy had a status essentially identical to that of the
Orthodox, and ordination in Catholicism endowed servitors with a distinct social status
(though the institution of celibacy distinguished the Catholic clergy substantially from
the  married  clergy  of  the  eastern  Christian  confessions).99 Protestant  pastors  simply
acquired personal nobility, which was something different from a distinct soslovie or even
real membership in the nobility.100 Despite the state’s apparent contemplation of creating
a Muslim clergy as a distinct order, this idea was realized only partially in Crimea, and
even then with the retention of a clear distinction between higher and lower clergy. For
the remaining non-Christian servitors, there were even fewer markers of soslovnost´. In
short, if Christian servitors tended to enjoy soslovie rights, then the rights of the non-
Christian servitors (and also Protestant pastors) are best understood as service rights. Yet
it is also clear that various servitors gradually acquired greater rights and privileges,
which placed them in a distinct position – at least for the duration of their clerical service
– in relation to the emperor’s other subjects.
28 The prospects for the creation of non-Orthodox clerical estates were probably greatest in
the decades from the 1830s to the 1860s. Arguably it was only with the first edition of the
Law Digest (1832) that even the status rights of the Orthodox clergy were fully codified in
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law. By the 1830s,  the state was in the process of  producing statutes for the foreign
confessions, which in some cases involved the explicit definition of rights and privileges
of religious servitors.  The gestures towards the possibility of a Muslim clerical estate
suggest that there was some impetus towards the aggregation of the various servitors. By
the 1860s, state policies on the Orthodox clergy turned away from the soslovie principle
and, despite a certain reassertion in the 1870s over the issue of priests’ widows, never
sought to reinstate them with the same vigor as before. It seems possible to conclude that
any  impulse  towards  the  full  organization  and  elaboration  of  non-Orthodox  sosloviia
simply came too late to receive any kind of realization. By the time such aspirations – if
indeed they did exist – could be fully formed, the state was already turning away from the
soslovie principle. Even so, the decision of tsarist lawmakers to exclude from the 1876
edition of the Law Digest the declaration that non-Christian servitors “do not constitute
particular estates in this country” – only to reintroduce it in 1899 – is tantalizing. Might
this have signified a willingness to contemplate non-Christian clerical estates or perhaps
even a general clerical estate for the servitors of Russia’s recognized religions?
29 Still,  there  are  also  good reasons  for  supposing that  the state  never  really  seriously
entertained the idea of having sosloviia for all the empire’s recognized faiths, let alone a
general clerical status for all of them. Two considerations appear to have been central.
First,  our account suggests that imperial  officials probably never knew enough about
these servitors and their precise functions to institutionalize clerical estates for all of
them. Regional and sectarian variations only complicated the matter. Second, there was
clearly  a  reluctance  even  to  gesture  towards  the  equality  of  various  non-Christian
servitors with Christian – and especially Orthodox – ones.  Here it is notable that the
principal tsarist proponent of extending the exemption from corporal punishment to the
“Muslim  clergy” –  Minister  of  State  Domains  Pavel Kiselev  –  felt  compelled  to  state
explicitly that he had no intention of equalizing the rights of the Muslim clergy with
those  of  “the  clergy  of  the  Christian  confessions.”101 The  creation  of  estates  might
establish a disturbing equivalence, implying that the state was somehow indifferent to
the content of the various religions that these servitors represented. In the end, then, the
state held to the principle that non-Christian servitors were not an estate of the realm,
and parish mullahs like Akhmed-ogly, despite their extensive service, were denied the
possibility of conferring privileged status on their children.
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ABSTRACTS
Abstract
This essay addresses a significant imperial dimension of the soslovie question by analyzing the
estate  status  of  the  religious  servitors  of  Russia’s  non-Orthodox  faiths  (the  “foreign
confessions”).  Its goal is  to ascertain the extent to which one may discern a clerical  estate (
dukhovnoe  sostoianie)  for  the  foreign  confessions,  the  standards  by  which  individuals  were
recognized as belonging to non-Orthodox clergies, and the rights and privileges to which these
religious servitors were entitled. Drawing on a distinction offered by Vasilii Kliuchevskii between
“estate rights” (soslovnye prava) and “service rights” (dolzhnostnye prava), the author argues that
Christian servitors, beginning with the Orthodox clergy, gradually acquired estate rights, while
non-Christian servitors were generally able to acquire only service rights. The reasons for this
outcome should be sought in a combination of practical and ideological concerns having to do
with  the  state’s  limited  knowledge  about  non-Orthodox  servitors,  its  commitments  to  the
privileging of (Orthodox) Christianity in Russia’s social order, and broader shifts in the state’s
soslovie policies.
Résumé
Par  son  analyse  du  statut  social  des  serviteurs  religieux  des  confessions  non-orthodoxes  de
Russie (« les confessions étrangères »), cet essai aborde une dimension impériale significative de
la  question des  ordres  (sosloviia).  Le  but  est  d’établir  dans  quelle  mesure  on peut  mettre  en
évidence l’existence d’un ordre clérical pour les confessions étrangères, distinguer les critères
selon  lesquels  les  individus  étaient  reconnus  comme  relevant  de  clergés  non-orthodoxes  et
pointer  les  droits  et  privilèges  auxquels  ces  serviteurs  religieux  pouvaient  prétendre.  En
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reprenant la distinction, avancée par Vasilij  Ključevskij,  entre « droits inhérents à un ordre (
soslovnye prava) » et « droits inhérents à une fonction (dolžnostnye prava) », l’auteur démontre que
les serviteurs chrétiens, à commencer par le clergé orthodoxe, avaient progressivement acquis
des droits inhérents à leur ordre, tandis que les serviteurs non-chrétiens n’avaient généralement
pu  acquérir  que  les  seuls  droits  propres  à  leur  fonction.  Cet  état  de  fait  résulterait  de  la
combinaison d’intérêts pratiques et idéologiques, associés à la connaissance limitée de l’État sur
les  serviteurs  non-orthodoxes,  aux  engagements  de  celui-ci  à  privilégier  la  chrétienté
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